Professor Pandit, working among the admirable group of philosophers at the University of Delhi, has written a fundamental criticism and a constructive re-interpretation of all that has been preserved as serious epistemological and methodological reflections on the sciences in modern Western philosoph- from the times of Galileo, Newton, Descartes and Leibniz to those of Russell and Wittgenstein, Carnap and Popper, and, we need hardly add, onward to the troubling relativisms and reconstructions of historical epistemologies in the works of Hanson, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend.
Only in fairly recent years has History and Philosophy of Science been recognized - though not always under that name - as a distinct field of scholarly endeavour.
For the philosopher interested in the idea of objective knowledge of the real world, the nature of science is of special importance, for science, and more particularly physics, is today considered to be paradigmatic in its affording of such knowledge.
Much is said in Marxist literature about Marxist methodology which is supposed to be entirely original - differing a great deal from all other trends in the modern philosophy of science.
In 1965 the International Union of the History and Philosophy of Science founded the Nicolas Copernicus Committee whose main task was to explore the means by th which different nations could co-operate in celebrating the 5 centenary of the great scholar's birth.
For some centuries now the western world has endeavored to choose between rationalism and empiricism; or, when a choice was found impossible, somehow to reconcile them.
This volume, honoring the renowned historian of science, Allen G Debus, explores ideas of science - `experiences of nature' - from within a historiographical tradition that Debus has done much to define.
This collection presents perspectives into the pristine field of phenomenology/philosophy of life conceived by Tymieniecka, initiated in the Analecta Husserliana and unfolding with each volume.
On January 22, 1990, the late John Bell held at CERN (European Laboratory for Particle Physics), Geneva a seminar organized by the Center of Quantum Philosophy, that at this time was an association of scientists interested in the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In this collection of essays Allan Franklin defends the view that science provides us with knowledge about the world which is based on experimental evidence and on reasoned and critical discussion.
In her Introduction, Tymieniecka states the core theme of the present book sharply: Is culture an excess of nature's prodigious expansiveness - an excess which might turn out to be dangerous for nature itself if it goes too far - or is culture a 'natural', congenial prolongation of nature-life?
Mathematics is often considered as a body of knowledge that is essen- tially independent of linguistic formulations, in the sense that, once the content of this knowledge has been grasped, there remains only the problem of professional ability, that of clearly formulating and correctly proving it.
The splendid achievements of Japanese mathematics and natural sciences during the second half of our 20th century have been a revival, a Renaissance, of the practical sciences developed along with the turn toward Western thinking in the late 19th century.
According to the modal interpretation, the standard mathematical framework of quantum mechanics specifies the physical magnitudes of a system, which have definite values.
When we ask whether something exists, we expect a yes or no answer, not a further query about what kind of existence, how much of it, whether we mean existence for you or existence for me, or whether we are asking about some property which it might have.
The articles in this volume of ARCHIMEDES examine particular cases of `reception' in ways that emphasize pressing historiographical and methodological issues.