The present collection represents an attempt to bring together several contributions to the ongoing debate pertaining to supervenience of the normative in law and morals and strives to be the first work that addresses the topic comprehensively.
Representationalism grasps the meaning and grammar of linguistic expressions in terms of reference; that is, as determined by the respective objects, concepts or states of affairs they are supposed to represent, and by the internal structure of the content they articulate.
The volume takes on the much-needed task of describing and explaining the nature of the relations and interactions between mind, language and action in defining mentality.
The volume takes on the much-needed task of describing and explaining the nature of the relations and interactions between mind, language and action in defining mentality.
The papers in this volume present some of the most recent results of the work about contradictions in philosophical logic and metaphysics; examine the history of contradiction in crucial phases of philosophical thought; consider the relevance of contradictions for political and philosophical actuality.
This book collects a renowned scholar's essays from the past five decades and reflects two main concerns: an approach to logic that stresses argumentation, reasoning, and critical thinking and that is informal, empirical, naturalistic, practical, applied, concrete, and historical; and an interest in Galileo's life and thought-his scientific achievements, Inquisition trial, and methodological lessons in light of his iconic status as "e;father of modern science.
The volume collects papers on central aspects of Alexius Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (Theory of Objects) and its transformation in contemporary logic, semantics and ontology covering the impact of his views on grasping and representation, the status of nonexistent or inconsistent objects and their incorporation in theories like Noneism and Possible-World-Semantics.
Representationalism grasps the meaning and grammar of linguistic expressions in terms of reference; that is, as determined by the respective objects, concepts or states of affairs they are supposed to represent, and by the internal structure of the content they articulate.
The volume collects papers on central aspects of Alexius Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (Theory of Objects) and its transformation in contemporary logic, semantics and ontology covering the impact of his views on grasping and representation, the status of nonexistent or inconsistent objects and their incorporation in theories like Noneism and Possible-World-Semantics.
The papers in this volume present some of the most recent results of the work about contradictions in philosophical logic and metaphysics; examine the history of contradiction in crucial phases of philosophical thought; consider the relevance of contradictions for political and philosophical actuality.
A Chance for Possibility defends the view that the objective modal realm is tripartite: truths about possible worlds supervene on modal truths, which in turn supervene on truths about objective chances.
The second volume is devoted to issues of compositionality that arouse in the sciences of language, the investigation of the mind, and the modeling of representational brain functions.
Nicholas Rescher has enjoyed a long and distinguished career in philosophy, writing on many different areas from logic to philosophy of language, epistemology, pragmatism, ethics and political philosophy, and metaphilosophy.
This book aims to develop a philosophical theory of extrinsic properties - of properties whose instantiation by an object does not only depend on what the object itself is like, but also on features of its environment.
The present collection of seventeen papers, most of them already published in international philosophical journals, deals both with issues in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language and epistemology.
Jerzy Perzanowski's ideas were based on an original blend of logic and ontology in what he called onto/logic, where the slash is meant to suggest a quotient of ontology by logic.
